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A COGNITIVE MAN AND A LANGUAGE REPRESENTATION. 
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE WAYS OF MENTAL RECORD 
OF INFORMATION
The psychological studies show that a man stores information in his mind, in the 
form o f  cognitive-semantic models or schemes. The aim o f the following paper is 
an attempt to systematize approaches and ideas concerning the information repre­
sentation in language. This research will present the psychological findings which 
provided some new methods o f a language description, then some o f  the notions 
(introduced by G. Fauconnier, Ch. Fillmore, J.-P. Descles, M. Johnson, G. Lakoff,
R. Langacker, J. Sowa, R. Schank and R. Abelson), which describe the semantic 
structure will be discussed. The author will try to demonstrate that this variability 
o f theories and ideas refers in fact to one and the same problem, which is the con­
ceptual record and representation o f perceived reality, which actually takes the sym­
bolic form anchored in language.
The concept o f describing a language which characterizes cognitive linguistics 
is based on the relations between perception, cognition and language. In other words, 
the language will be discussed as a symbolic record in the form o f schemes or mod­
els, lexical and grammatical structures functioning in a language which represent 
our knowledge about the world. Knowledge, however, appears to be an extremely 
complex and interdependent collection of mental entities originating in the process 
o f cognition initiated by the experience of reality. To experience reality means to 
receive, by the use o f senses, different impulses on the basis o f which people create 
notions. This is frequently referred to as the process of conceptualization. Categori­
zation, on the other hand, is the process in which we define everything what is per­
ceived or felt. R. Langacker (1995) defines conceptualization as a mental experi­
ence comprising of sensor-like experience, and a process of creating new notions 
and contextual knowledge. Categorization is defined as a man’s ability to recognize 
notions and to give them meanings.
A new concept o f a category formed on the basis o f a prototype was formulated 
in the works o f E. Rosch (1978). The research results o f E. Rosch and her succes­
sors can be summarized in the following way: a man categorizes the world on the 
basis o f the so called cognitive universalism, stemming from biological-psychologi­
cal conditions and cultural relativism since categorization is a historical and cultur­
al product as well.
The categories possess inner prototype structure which means that the place in 
a given category depends on the degree of similarity to a prototype which makes its 
center. Thus, the organization of the categories does not depend on vital and suffi­
cient features, common to all elements of a given category, but on the collection of 
typical features shared with the prototype. The fact o f belonging to the category is 
based on the principle called family resemblance. But the limits o f the category are 
blurred, which as a result can lead to the change o f category organization. The cate­
gories are defined holistically and make up a hierarchical system o f relations. Pro­
totypes are privileged categories because they include the most indispensable infor­
mation and they are the quickest to leam and to memorize. They somehow build 
the base level to which we refer the moment we experience and define reality.
The notion o f a prototype apart from difficulties connected with its definition 
found an important place in linguistic theories and has provided the basis for creat­
ing the so called semantics o f the prototype (Kleiber 1990).
Seeing that the reality is conceptualized in cognitive terms it follows that men­
tal structures are the starting point o f their possible verbal expression. Thus cogni­
tive structures manifest themselves through symbolic structures, that is in a language. 
The observations mentioned above determine the research subject o f cognitive lin­
guistics -  that is semantic or semantic-cognitive representations together with the 
results o f categorization expressed in the use of language.
When formulating their theories cognitive linguists refer very often to a notion 
o f a mental representation. This term appeared for the first time in the works of 
psychologists who carried out research aimed at studying the ways o f recording in­
formation, that is a memory, founded by R. Shepard (1971). Together with J. Metz- 
ler and S. Kosslyn, he conducted research which revealed that in the moment of 
solving problems people use not only data o f symbolic nature, but also the ones which 
are almost iconic-like. It means that they are able to form and operate mental figur- 
al representations. According to Kosslyn’s theory (1980), concepts and sentences that 
is a language make the basis for creating mental pictures. They belong to a lan­
guage-like memory which should be distinguished from a picture-like memory.
P. Johnson-Laird (1983) modifies the opinion about a mental representation em­
phasizing its schematic nature because not all phenomena taking place in the world 
can be described in the form o f a picture. As a result he introduces a notion of 
a mental model, an abstract figure more or less schematic, corresponding to a frag­
ment o f reality. He states that “because mental models can take different forms and 
fulfill different aims their content is varied. They can include only symbols repre­
senting only units and the relations between them, just as in models which are used 
in syllogistic reasoning. They can show spatial relations between objects and casu­
al; or temporal relations between events” (1983: 410). I f  that is the case he distin­
guished 3 types o f mental representations including statement representations and
mental models corresponding to real objects having a definite structure and pictures 
which, as it were, make a collection of a few mental models. It seems obvious that 
a man not only possesses the ability to form models, but also he can manipulate 
them to formulate opinions and transfer them to other people giving them a form of 
a language expression.
Then, the fact o f distinguishing by B. Darras (1998) a visual thought referring 
to visual perception and a figurative thought referring to a cognitive feature and to 
the world reconstruction, helped the scientist to describe two types o f mental repre­
sentations. These are similes which are the copy of the reality so they are character­
ized by a high level o f similarity to perceived reality and schemes which are ab­
stract representations o f general or specific character.
Summing up psychological research on information record it should be said that 
mental representation is connected with the mechanism which makes it possible for 
an individual to form inner representations o f figurative character which are called 
pictures, schemes or models depending on the degree of notion abstractness. These, 
in turn, correspond to categories which include all our knowledge o f the world. They 
are stored up in a permanent memory and can be put into motion by new cognitive 
or emotional experience which manifests itself in our verbal and non verbal behav­
ior. They have a form o f complete spatial structures either dynamic or static with 
different levels of organization.
However not only psychologists have been interested in a human thought the 
way o f its record and the role it fulfils in human life. Together with the appearance 
of a scientific project of creating a man’s model, the problem of reconstructing thought 
rights, its simulation and representation became the core of interest o f information 
technology specialists. This was the moment when scientists started to speak about 
Artificial Intelligence.
The achievements in neurology have played an important role in the develop­
ment o f connectionism, one o f the Artificial Intelligence studies, which is called. 
The question is how to build a model being a reflection o f links between neurons. 
Nowadays such a model is called a self adapting neuron-like network. These are 
circuits consisting o f multi stratified links which are able to form representations of 
real phenomena, or so called patterns, and to recognize them on the basis o f partial 
information, classify them and also to identify reality. According to R. Gregory (2000: 
55) “there are grounds to believe that the systems operating on the basis of parallel 
diffused transformation principle will recognize a language and talk sensibly although 
it remains unknown how they should acquire consciousness.”
As for the works from the field o f psychology and Artificial Intelligence there 
is one that must be mentioned, R. Quillian’s theory o f semantic networks (1968). 
According to R. Quillian a man is able to find the meaning o f a word by linking it 
to all other meanings, which somehow define the word. The meaning, what follows, 
does not have an absolute character but it depends on other meanings that are hid­
den in a semantic memory of associative nature. The suggestion o f the model is to 
treat this memory as a system consisting of knots of access. These knots are con­
cepts in the form o f units or properties while the links between them called arcs
which give information about the type of semantic relation. This theory contributed 
to the development o f computer programs which helped automatic translation. One 
of the works which, inspired by the notion o f semantic network, and certainly worth 
mentioning, is the theory o f conceptual graphs by J. Sowa (1984).
The theory o f conceptual graphs is not concerned with meaning o f the words, 
but with their meaning in sentences. The system o f conceptual graphs consists of 
a collection o f canonical sentences which specify models of semantic-syntactic rela­
tions. The truth value o f a sentence as well as its grammatical correctness are deter­
mined by comparing the graph corresponding to it with the canonic graph. Like in 
Quillian semantic network, each graph consists o f access knots which relate to no­
tions and relations between them. These relations, in turn, possess one or more arches 
which join notions. The notion has the form o f a prototype model representing gen­
erative object which is compared to sentence expressions corresponding to a given 
notion used in the graph. As it can be seen, the suggestion to interpret sentence 
information put forward by J. Sowa is based on the theory o f types and is also of 
association character.
In 1975, M. Minsky among others define the notion o f a frame. In Psychology 
a scheme is understood as a collection of concepts describing a situation, a condi­
tion or a past event, which have been recorded in a memory and which are recalled 
by us in new situations or events. The author o f this theory defines the frame as the 
structure o f information which represents a stereotype situation. It is the collection 
of features that characterize a notion. These features describe certain facettes o f the 
given notion, they are either o f declarative or procedural nature and they make cer­
tain kinds o f sub-frames distinguished on the basis of features hierarchy is. So it 
follows, that a human mind is a network consisted o f frames which in turn consist 
of access knots and relations. This system has a hierarchical structure based on fea­
ture inheritance. Minsky’s theory was to show a mechanism o f setting into motion 
only some specified information from our knowledge when solving different kinds 
of problems in real life situations.
Inspired by the frames theory, R. Schank and R. Abelson (1977) introduce 
a notion o f  a script or a scenario into a model o f knowledge and they define it as 
a structure o f  information corresponding to our knowledge o f a certain type of 
a situation. This script is o f procedural nature, it does not describe notions but scenes 
from everyday life. Every scene is described with the use o f a certain collection of 
conceptual primitives (there are 11 o f them) describing physical activities, global 
activities, and instrumental or mental activities.
There is no doubt that a fundamental importance of imagery in a description of 
linguistic phenomena was emphasized by R. Langacker (1987) in his cognitive gram­
mar. A notion o f the imagery explains the role of a language as a medium o f ex­
pressing different ways o f describing the same situation, condition or an event. These 
representations, called scenes by Langacker, differ in stressing some aspects or ele­
ments o f a perceived object, phenomenon or a situation, a degree o f their character­
istic, perspective from which they are seen and they are the source of meaning on 
which grammar depends on. The imagery, what follows, is understood as a mental
process depending on constructing a scene, which has the following dimension:
1. the level o f schematization, 2. background that is a context which proceeds a sit­
uation, our expectations connected with it, presupposition, 3. perspective which re­
flects the direction o f mental scanning, that is, a point from which we see a scene, 
4. profiling being based on distinguishing from a cognitive basis certain notional 
structures which are the basis for predication that is for forming semantic structures 
and taking adequate language forms. As it can be seen, when discussing the notion 
o f profiling. R. Langacker refers to the notion o f a domain that is a definite experi­
ence having a gestalt form. The domains are a starting point for categorization and 
categories, which in turn make the basis for formulating statements. According to 
R. Langacker, categorization takes place either by a prototype or by a scheme. In 
the first case we refer back to our basic knowledge and in the second case we specify 
an object or situations in relation to the scheme. Therefore prototypes and schemes 
would make categories, that is, the elements of our knowledge being a point of ref­
erence when identifying new objects, situations or events.
When discussing imagery, R. Langacker describes other mental operations in­
cluding mental scanning, selection, abstraction or comparison on the basis o f which 
a man designs a scene.
Making a mental representation involves formulating meanings by referring to 
our knowledge stored in our memory and to our knowledge which follows from the 
context: “A meaning o f an expression is not only the collection o f cognitive sub­
stance but also it is composed o f conventional imagery that take part in formulating 
cognitive content provided by the recalled domain” (R. Langacker 1995: 18). Put­
ting it differently, every impulse coming from the world puts into motion definite 
categorical elements o f our knowledge, including categories and this mechanism 
makes the basis for creating meanings, which finally take a verbal form so they re­
fer to definite language categories. Therefore, every statement is a reflection of 
a mental model o f iconic nature.
Since the process o f imagery is anchored in perception its results are spatially- 
temporal. They form a kind o f space in which a representation is created on the 
basis o f descriptive mechanics, called symbolic space by R. Langacker. A language 
is understood as grammar functions in this space. Grammar then is defined as 
a structural catalogue of conventional language units which are anchored in two other 
spaces -  phonological and semantic. The latter is defined as a place where concep­
tualization takes place that is giving meaning to representations. All language units 
and in consequence categories corresponding to them can be described in the form 
of iconic model more or less schematic.
Discussing the main assumptions o f Langacker’s theory we must not forget to 
mention the phenomenon o f interdisciplinarines which is reflected in the terminol­
ogy suggested by a researcher and in the meaning of a relation existing between 
perceiving the world, that is its mental experiencing and mental operations, the re­
sult of which are notional structures o f iconic character, a different degree o f ab­
stractness and a language in which notions become language categories that are used 
to form a statement.
Taking into account the purpose of research that is a description by the struc­
ture o f thought, the process of ideas mixing together can also be observed in the 
field o f linguistics itself. It is common knowledge that we should mention here the 
theory o f idealized cognitive models by G. Lakoff (1987), the semantic o f frames by 
Ch. Fillmore (1985), the theory o f mental spaces by G. Fauconnier (1984) or the 
application and cognitive grammar by J.P. Desclés (1990).
G. Lakoff defines an idealized cognitive model (IMC) as a complex, structured 
entity by the use o f which we organize our knowledge and the by-products of this 
organization are category structures and prototype effects. IMC can take the follow­
ing form: 1. propositional structure, 2. notional-schematic structure, 3. metaphori­
cal or metonymical expansion. IMC are anchored in a language, in statements made 
by us very often o f metaphorical or metonymical character.
For Ch. Fillmore a frame will be a sort o f a scheme including information con­
cerned with experience and representing a given object or a situation. It is recalled 
in a definite situation and it makes possible for the reality to be identified. Putting 
it differently, words that we use in a given context call for an interpretative frame 
constituting a background for every figure and by which we understand a meaning 
of a given statement. A certain type of relation makes it possible to identify the fig­
ure from the background. Fillmore’s aim was to find and describe relations which 
oven the elements o f a language.
The theory o f mental spaces by G. Fauconnier is also based on recalling struc­
tures o f our knowledge belonging to different initial spaces emerging in a specific 
situation. A mental operation called a conceptual integration makes it possible for 
a generative space to emerge which is a common space for initial spaces and an 
integrating space of information from the initial space has taken place and which 
reflects itself in language forms.
J.P. Desclés distinguishes three levels in the suggested model o f grammar. These 
are: 1. cognitive level where there are cognitive archetypes which are reflections of 
our biological behavior and as a result they are independent of natural language.
2. genotypical level in which archetypes are transformed into cognitive-semantic 
schemes, that is, abstract forms which are configurations o f archetypes and corre­
sponding to universal language units (grammatical) 3. phenotypical level where the 
interpretation o f cognitive-semantic schemes through/by the structure o f  the defi­
nite natural language takes place.
All these theories, although completely separated by methods and goals, em­
phasize the existence o f  a sort o f space or level in which our knowledge is formed. 
It would be the space bringing together all which is seen by the use o f senses and 
that what is expressed in the categories o f a natural language and it would make 
a specific architecture o f interpreted notion.
The fact o f introducing the notion o f a imagery into a language description turned 
out to be revolutionary for two fundamental reasons. First o f all, it contributed to 
intense development o f linguistic research inspiring and encouraging a great num­
ber of young people to carry out intensive studies o f language nature and functions 
opening up possibilities of their development on the way o f penetrating the secrets
of human thought. Secondly it created new possibilities as far as the process of teach­
ing is concerned especially when talking about foreign languages. The cognitive psy­
chology says that knowledge is not acquired, it is created and formed. This kind of 
approach based on the belief that the reality, including a language one, is construct­
ed or to be more precise reconstructed, brings much more better results because stu­
dents themselves are the creators of their knowledge and they acquire it better, re­
member easier -  they are more creative and less tired. In this process they use cog­
nitive abilities to comprehensive understanding of a situation or a problem, to make 
categorizations with reference to a prototype or a scheme or to record information 
in the form o f a representation more or less schematic. All these cognitive abilities 
as well as mental operations, on the basis o f which the process o f transforming in­
formation in brain and giving it a language form takes place are the characteristics 
o f a cognitive man whose functioning in the world is determined by the act o f see­
ing. And the act o f seeing precedes the words as a picture comes before a language. 
The language makes a frame for the picture and the frame itself seems to be beauti­
ful for only a few. Therefore in order to examine and describe the language it is 
necessary to leam the nature o f thoughts because a thought is a image o f which 
a cognitive man is the creator.
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